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ABSTRACT 
In terms of effects, there are divergent perspectives on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. 
One of the implications of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria‘s as a nation is on the aspect of 
socio-economic activities of the country, especially on the North-Eastern part. Fundamentalism 
is an effort by religious interpreters who like to go back to that they believe to be pure and 
original values and behaviour. Social change is important for the emergence of fundamentalism. 
Whenever there are drastic changes in society and a pace of change which disturbs community 
life, there is an adverse effect on the socio-economic development of the people and society. 
Studies on Fundamentalism have not offers restitution to this problem. To achieve this, 
fundamentalists evolve a comprehensive and absolutist rigid belief system and practice. This 
study, therefore, examined fundamentalism and socio-economic development in the North-
Eastern zone of Nigeria with particular reference to the Boko Haram movement. Social 
Movement Theory (SMT) provided the conceptual framework for this study and the secondary 
method of data collection materials was used to elicit information for the study. Recently, 
Nigeria has witnessed a rise in the numbers of radical Islamic sects notably among them is Boko 
Haram. These sects have resorted to the use of violence in a bid to realizing their ambitions of a 
wider Islamization of the Nigerian Population. This study shows that the Perspectives shared on 
the rise of these radical movements are: poor socio-economic infrastructures, poor governance 
and poverty as a major catalyst to the rapid increase in the membership of these groups.  
Key words: Fundamentalism, Fundamentalists, Social movement, Islamization,  
         Socio- Religious Identity 
Introduction  
Fundamentalism refers to a sect or movement within a religion that emphasizes a rigid 
adherence to what it conceives of as the fundamental principles of its faith, usually resulting in a 
denouncement of alternative practices and interpretations (Brasher, 2001:17). There are 
fundamentalist sects in almost all of the world's major religions, including Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism and Judaism. Cross-culturally, fundamentalism is characterized by a cluster of 
common attributes including a literal interpretation of scripture, a suspicion of outsiders, a sense 
of alienation from the secular culture, a distrust of liberal elites, and the belief in the historical 
accuracy and inerrancy of their own interpretation of their religious scriptures.  
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Additionally, religious fundamentalists are often politically active and may feel that the 
state must be subservient to God (Brasher, 2001:17). Although, it believed that fundamentalism 
was initially at the level of advocacy, its impact on violent fundamentalist groups could not be 
wished away, yet the approach of the same government whose legitimacy is being questioned to 
the problem of Islamic fundamentalism could at best be described as lackadaisical. This brings 
into focus the issue of fundamentalism, Boko Haram movement and socio-economic 
development in North-eastern zone of Nigeria.  
Problems  
Boko Haram activities was described by US intelligence agents in November 2011-as a 
local salafist group attacking Christians and local police stations with matchet and poison tipped 
arrows in Nigeria„s north-eastern states (Ezema, 2013:14, c.f., Campbell, 2011). According to 
him: 
Boko Haram is a way of thinking, it is politically driven, and they 
are loosely organized grassroots insurrection against not only the 
Abuja government but the traditional Muslim establishment as well  
(Ezema, 2013:14, c.f., Campbell, 2011) 
After nearly a decade of violence, Nigeria government still does not have an effective 
strategy for dismantling the group (Ezema, 2013:15). The terrorist organization preys on the 
disillusioned Muslims of the north, who are fed up with corruption. And have few economic 
opportunities, Nigeria is a heterogeneous country divided by two religious beliefs aside 
traditional religion. The northern half of the country is almost completely Muslim (50 per cent of 
the total Nigerians population) and the southern half is mostly dominated by Christians (40 per 
cent of the total Nigerians population).  
Originating in the Muslim dominated northern region of the country, the movement 
rejected everything deemed western. The activities of these groups-Boko Haram grew its ranks 
by taking advantages of the widespread anger in the north over the country„s gap. In the north, 
72 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, compared to only 22 percent in the 
southern part (Ezema, 2013:16). The political goal of Boko Haram sect is to create an Islamic 
nation in the twelve northern states of Nigerians, eventually, spreading to the rest of the country. 
From its inception Boko Haram viewed Nigeria as a state or a country running by non-believers 
and made the government its main target, even when the country had a Muslim president 
(Ezema, 2013:16).  
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Therefore, this study seeks to find the following: Does the Boko Haram sect as a fundamentalist 
movement have any implication on the socio-economic development of the North-eastern zone 
of Nigeria? 
Brief Review of Literature  
This aspect of the study covers the literature review and the theoretical framework that was used 
in this study. 
Conceptualizing the term Fundamentalism  
There is the sociological meaning of “fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist.” For the 
past three decades sociologists have been defining “fundamentalism” as “religious anti-
modernism.” Allegedly, anyone who is against modernity for religious reasons is a 
“fundamentalist” (Woodberry & Smith, 1998:25). But there are some problems with that. First, 
it‟s simply too broad. Second, many fundamentalists, historically, were consciously or 
unconsciously influenced by modernity. Third, fundamentalists are often the most willing to 
make religious use of modern technological innovations. Fourth, many spiritually-minded 
postmodern people could be called anti-modern in certain ways but could not rightly be called 
fundamentalists (Ruthven, 2005:3). 
Historically, the term "fundamentalism" was first used in the early 1900s among 
American Protestant Christians who strove to return to the "fundamentals" of Biblical faith, and 
who stressed the literally interpreted Bible as fundamental to Christian life and teaching (Aldon, 
1996:29). The subsequent growth of religious fundamentalism in the twentieth century has been 
tied to the perceived challenge that both secularism and liberal values pose to traditional 
religious authorities, values and theological truth claims Fundamentalism appeals to religious 
believers who feel threatened by the encroachment of liberal values into traditionally religious 
spheres (Maryjane, 1996:86). They feel besieged by secular culture which they regard as 
immoral and godless. 
In the early 1970s 'fundamentalist' was used to refer only to those groups that also 
engaged in political or militant behaviour (Christian, 1996:9) and for a while the term looked set 
to exclusively refer to Islamic groups. Knowing the ambiguities, many academics are wary of the 
word. Keddie (1998: 696) opined that it should only be use to describe movements that oppose 
modernity, and therefore only groups that have arisen after 1800-1850 CE.  
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It has instead grown to describe a huge variety of religious groups, often simply being a code-
word for "a group we don't like" (Quintan, 2006: 207) like the word "cult".  
The current state of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as it is manifested in Boko Haram 
is a product of Nigerian societal and economic problems or is tied to the broader Islamic revival 
as marked by the rise of al Qaeda and its derivative groups. Perhaps as it often is with complex 
societal insurgencies, it is a combination of all of these factors. An analysis of existing literature 
exposes many familiar themes: the presence of oil, corrupt government officials, a history of 
Islamic prominence; a colonial legacy, including drawing borders with little importance given to 
ethnic or religious history; and a rejecting of Western influence (Ezema, 2013:16).  
A major challenge faced by the central government in Nigeria since the return of civil 
rule in 1999 was the introduction of Sharia law in some states in northern Nigeria, with Zamfara 
blazing the trail. The law now operates in twelve of the nineteen northern states, with varying 
manifestations (Nmehielle, 2004: 730; Ostien, 2007). Going by constitutional provision, the 
adoption of Sharia law meant the existence of dual legal systems in those states, as well as the 
adoption of state religion, contrary to the provision of section 10 of the 1999 Constitution, which 
states expressly that “the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion 
as State Religion” (Federal Military Government 1999).  
But even at that, Boko Haram movement in particular criticized the limited application of 
Sharia and condemned the insincerity of the state governors, whom it accused of politicizing it. 
This explains why the full implementation of Sharia not only in the north, but the whole of the 
country, was the advertised cause of the jihad. Like Boko Haram, but for different reasons, the 
federal government under Olusegun Obasanjo condemned the adoption, which it saw as 
unconstitutional, a political phenomenon that would soon “fizzle out” (Tell, 2001). One of the 
governors who introduced Sharia became the country‟s president and ruled until 5 May 2010, 
when he died; some of them are currently facing trial for corrupt practices while in office a 
vindication of sorts of the critics of Sharia adoption (The Guardian, 2003).  
Viewed from a broader perspective, the adoption of Sharia appeared like an effort to 
pacify a section of Muslims who had consistently agitated against the secularity of the country, 
and perhaps were seen as a threat to the tenure of the political officeholders or a support base that 
could not be neglected on the basis of political calculation. The undue emphasis on religion as a 
basis for differentiation and mobilization accounts for this, but the measure appeared not strong 
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enough to appease these elements which, when they would not embark on insurrection, would 
not check it before it degenerated, or feebly condemn it.  
Legitimizing power by northern traditional rulers was an open door to Islamic 
fundamentalism from the start (Abimbola, 2010:100). As far as Hickey (1984: 251) is concerned; 
this position or ambivalence of these elements was not dictated by the lack of belief in the 
extremists‟ position: the difference is over method, rather than ultimate aims.  
The extremists insist on a unitary view of the society, which sees no difference between 
the state and religion, and they advocate making Nigeria an Islamic state, administered according 
to the principles of Sharia. For them, all Muslims belong to the umma (community), and the idea 
of a secular state is atheistic or syncretistic (Dickinson, 2007). Apart from challenging the 
Muslim affirmation of religious principles, especially Sharia, the imposition of secularity 
according to them amounts to a cultural affront on a significant portion of the population and 
reduces them to the status of second-class citizens.  
Although this view is claimed to be a Quranic injunction, it does not enjoy popular 
acceptance among liberal Muslims, who maintain that such a view does not imply the need for 
Islamization of Nigeria, nor does it endorse non-acceptance of the constitutional provision of the 
secularity of the state (Ibrahim, 1998: 66; Ilesanmi, 2001: 529; Imo, 1995). Pertinent also is the 
failure of governance and its labeling as a tyranny that must be discarded, prompting the 
leadership and members of the movements to risk death to pursue what they consider the path to 
Islamic justice (Danjibo, 2009:29). Even before the Boko Haram and Maitatsine riots, 
fundamentalist groups like the Shiite had advocated a fanatical position that, in a wider political 
sense, meant the rejection of the secular authority ab initio (Suleiman, 2009:19).  
Reasons for fundamentalist Activities  
Differences in religions have been responsible for deeper divisions within communities 
than any other source of conflict. This assertion occupies a sad, but remarkable position in the 
history of the world. A number of factors may be responsible for this. 
Religious Intolerants 
Religion may become a divisive force when a society is faced with conflicting and 
mutually intolerant religions. Christianity and Islam are at one stage or another involved in this 
type of conflict, for example, the clash between Muslims and Christians in the days of the latter 
(Christians) penetration into the Mediterranean world. It was this confrontation that later 
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culminated into the Christian crusades, an attempt by the Christians to regain the control of 
Jerusalem. This crusade represented the reaction of Christian Europe against Muslim Asia 
(Osaretin, 2015:3).   
It was on that record that the spread of Islam into Syria and Asia Minor, as well as Spain 
and Sicily in Europe by jihad had infuriated the European Christian (i.e. Byzantine). The 
Christians captured Jerusalem back from Muslims on July 15, 1099 after it had been in Muslims 
hands for 61 years. Muslims took back Jerusalem on October 2, 1187 some 88 years after the 
Christians gained it. This kind of cat and dog existence continued among the Christians and 
Muslims until the creation of the Independent State of Israel on 14th May, 1948 (Osaretin, 
2015:3).  
This was the crux of the crises in the Middle East. Another cause of religious fanaticism 
is diverse interpretation of doctrine within the same religion. The example that readily comes to 
mind is the Protestant Reformation and the various religious wars that ensued in Europe. For 
example, French wars of religion 1562-1610; the Netherlands revolt 1578-1609, and the thirty 
years war between Catholic and Protestant States in Europe 1618-1648 (Armstrong, 2001:58).  
Muslims also have this type of mutually intolerant interpretation of the same religion 
(Armstrong, 2001). Less than three decades following prophet Mohammed‟s death, there arose 
many Muslim sects, among which were the Kharijites, who held that the leadership of the 
Muslim community neither belonged to some branch of Mohammed‟s family, nor to a certain 
Arab tribe, but to the one best qualified for it (Armstrong, 2001:58).  
In Nigeria, two major issues have succeeded in causing religious intolerance. They are 
Secularism in the Nigerian State and Indoctrination of the Nigerian citizens. Secularism was the 
major debate during the Constituent Assembly in 1978 as regards Sharia Court of Appeal. 
Section 10 of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions say that “the Government of the Federation or of a 
State shall not adopt any religion as state religion”. Section 35 of the same constitution declares 
that: 
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion including freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom … to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in 
worship, teaching, practice and observation (CFR, 1979, 1999:35). 
 
In the opinion of Balogun (1988:328), a critical examination of the Constitutional 
provision is improperly defined and loosely interpreted.  
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To him, this has given way to inconsistencies. He questioned the rationale for funding 
Pilgrimage to Mecca and Jerusalem, and the establishment of a National Religious Council by a 
secular Nigerian State. Balogun (1988:328) also identified a fundamental difference in organic 
religious socialization to state secularism between Islam and Christianity. To him, State 
secularism is a concept which asserts the principle of separation of the Church and State. 
While Christians may support the concept, the Muslims, in accordance to the tenets of 
their faith, cannot be inclined to state secularism. To Balogun (1988: 328), this fundamental 
difference caused a series of time-bombs which nearly reached the point of explosion during the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) issue in Nigeria. He therefore suggested Re-
interpretation and reworking of the Constitution in such a way that Nigeria would be recognized 
as a multi-religious state.  
Poverty 
Poverty is the deprivation of basic needs which commonly known as food, clothing, 
shelter healthcare and education. Nigeria is an underdeveloped country and poverty is one of the 
problems bedeviling the country. Nigeria is very rich in term of natural resources. Nigeria is one 
of the largest producer of oil in the world. The country is also blessed with vast arable land for 
agriculture and it is also rich in solid minerals (Omemma, 2012). 
However, the country has been so bedeviled with bad leadership since independence that 
the country today despite her redness in natural resources, is one of the poorest countries in the 
world in terms of per capital income (Omemma, 2012). The level of Poverty is so high that one 
time Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Soludo (2007) said that, poverty was an issue of 
the North. Also, it was opined that poverty is fueling Boko Haram and same vein, former 
president of US; Bill Clinton echoed the same view.  
These realities are much more obvious in rural areas and slums. In these places, people 
die because they cannot afford #500 to purchase needed medication or basic public health care 
(Soludo, 2007). Worse still, people around may not be able to help as they too may not be able to 
collectively raise that amount. It is a very obvious reality in today„s Nigeria. The fundamental 
imperfection in the macroeconomic structure of Nigeria is unsustainable, and that our politics 
cannot crowd out the impending reaction to their unaddressed problem.   
Karl Marx is popularly known for a truism which emphasizes our current reality, when he 
stated that religions is the opium of the poor, yet it is not only about religion but our historical 
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cultural practices of deliberately putting people in a state of ignorance. Thus the greater the level 
of poverty, the higher the level of illiteracy and of course, more poverty, these dynamically 
reinforce each other. Accordingly, when a young man is poor and unemployed, he becomes a 
clean slate for any kind of brainwashing (The Nation, 2011). The brainwashing given to them 
provides a quasi-equivalent of employment and thus feels engaged in acting out what they have 
been brainwashed about.  This is the kind of situation we find with Boko Haram phenomenon. 
Unemployment  
The problem of chronic youth unemployment is very evident in Nigeria. Every year 
thousands of graduate are turn out for where there are no jobs. Nigerians street are littered with 
youth hawkers who ordinarily would have found gainful employment in some enterprises, or 
would have demonstrated their skill and resourcefulness if there is enabling environment. 
Instead, the youth have now shifted their attention to terrorism (Adepegba, 2011). 
Unemployment describes the conditions of people who are without jobs. The international labour 
organization (ILO) (2008), defines unemployment, as number of the economically active 
population who is without work but available for and seeking for work. When the supply of 
labour outstrips the demand for labour, it causes joblessness and unemployment.  
The presence of large army of unemployment youth in Nigeria is a clear case of failure of 
leadership to utilize abundant human and natural resources in the country to creates jobs that will 
engage the youths in production and meaningful economic activities (Adejumobi, 2011). The 
unemployed youths have become political thugs and blood-thirsty hoodlums at the disposal of 
the politicians. The point here is that when large numbers of youths are unemployed, their quest 
to survive may make them become willing tools in the hands of mavericks and disgruntled 
politicians who may want to use them for anti-social and clandestine political activities. The 
utilization of the unemployed youths to perpetuate ethno-religious clashes in the present 
democratic dispensation are well documented (Ibrahim, 1991: 115).  
Put in context, unemployment is higher in northern Nigeria than its southern counterpart. 
Government statistics shows that the northern states have the higher proportion of uneducated 
Nigerians. If you link a lack of education and attendant lack of opportunities to high male youth 
population, you can imagine why northern Nigeria is actually a breeding ground for Boko 
Haram‟s recruits. 
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Corruption  
It is a fact that there is high prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. According to Ezema 
(2013:18), “the rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has been simply because of the failure of 
successive Nigerian governments to curb corruption, deliver public services, generate economic 
opportunity, establish accountable securing institutions and engage communities both north and 
south in a more fully national polity”. The severe wealth and infrastructural disparities and the 
failure of the Nigerian government to enact policies that would enable the different ethnic 
nationalities that make up the country to better govern themselves seems to accentuate the 
problem for a country ranked 144 of the 177 countries ranked in the Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2013 (Transparency International, c.f. Ezema, 2013:23).  
The advent and Ideology of Boko Haram movement in Nigeria 
Book Haram whose real name is Jama‟atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda‟ Awati Wal Jihad (the 
Sunni Community for the propagation of the prophet‟s Teachings and Jihad), is a radical Islamic 
group founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in north-east Nigeria. The group is also active in 
other geographically contiguous states which include Cameroun, Chad and Niger. Estimates put 
its membership between 600 and 10,000 (Olagunju, 2011:10, cf. Osaretin).   
Although Boko Haram has been linked with al-Qaeda over the years, it expressed support 
for the Islamic State (IS) in 2014 and pledged formal allegiance on 7 March, 2015. In its early 
days, many observers saw the group as a social movement meant to articulate the collective 
interest of the poor (Olagunju, 2011:10, cf. Osaretin 2015). Although Boko Haram was not a 
violent movement at its inception, it has killed more than 5,000 civilians between July 2009 and 
June 2014 (this includes at least 2,000 in the first half of 2014, in a series of coordinated attacks 
predominantly in north-east of Nigeria (Sergie & Johnson 2014).   
The evolution of Boko Haram is a response to the socio-economic flux borne out of a 
combination of decades-long mismanagement and pervasive corruption in Nigeria (Olagunju, 
2011:10, cf. Osaretin 2015). Perhaps, this explains the adaptive nature of the group‟s methods 
and membership in the ever changing circumstances of the country‟s environmental ecology. 
According to Pérouse de Montclos (2014), cf. Osaretin 2015: 
This has allowed for multiple descriptions of the group to endure, 
bridging different narratives of terrorism, insurgency and 
criminality, where different drivers of conflict and instability have 
converged. 
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While it could be argued that the history of Nigeria is replete with the activities of Islamic 
sects, it is a fact that a multiplicity of domestic actors and interests combine within the complex 
political environment that the Nigerian represents to sustain the philosophy of these groups. For 
example, the criminality that drives the sectarian agenda of Boko Haram grew out of its 
confrontation with the Nigerian state (Osaretin 2015). Thus, the group‟s mutation into a 
radicalized violent insurgent group with shades of cultist and criminal motivations was due to 
prolonged period of mishandled response by the Nigerian government and its security forces. 
Originally a small group, Boko Haram with its grassroots appeal acted as a cohesive unit 
which retaliated to average killings of its members. For this reason and its rejection of Western 
education, the group is often compared to the Maitatsine movement of the 1970s and 1980s in 
northern Nigeria. The Maitatsine group, led by Mohammed Marwa condemned the reading of 
books other than the Quran. Unlike Marwa who claimed to be a prophet in the image of Usman 
Dan Fodio, Boko Haram‟s founding leader, Yusuf could pass for the leader of the 
underprivileged.  
Nevertheless, some analysts view the group as an extension of the Maitatsine movement 
(Johnson, 2011). This stems from the belief that its ideology was inspired by the determined 
commitment to the eradication of heresies and the implementation of the Sharia legal codes in 
Nigeria. To achieve this aim, Boko Haram believes that it requires a change of political regime in 
Nigeria because a democratic and secular constitution contravenes and is an affront to the laws 
of Allah. Boko Haram conducted its operations relatively peacefully during the first seven years 
of its existence.  
Although, there were repeated warnings on the potential danger of the group to the 
government, such warnings were ignored partly because the group was once used as a political 
leverage in the election of the then Born State governor, Sheriff Alimodu. The metamorphosis of 
Boko Haram into a terrorist group started with the investigation carried out by members of the 
Nigerian Police force in 2009 into its activities. Code name „Operation Flush‟, on 26th July of the 
same year, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members and confiscated weapons and 
bomb-making equipment.  
Consequently, a joint military task force operation was launched against the group and by 
30 July, more than 700 people had been killed (mostly Boko Haram member and police stations, 
prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed (Abimbola, 2010:99). 
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Subsequently, the leader of the group, Yusuf was arrested and died in custody. The Nigerian 
military repression of Boko Haram‟s in July 2009 uprising and the emergency rule imposed by 
government in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in north-east-Nigeria since 2012 certainly 
contributed to an intensification of violence and the group‟s transformation into a terrorist group. 
Equally contributory was the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in police custody in July 
2009 which led to the enthronement of the more radicalized members of the group headed by 
Abubakar Shekau (Abimbola, 2010:99). 
 In fact, those who were initially interested in negotiation with the Nigerian government 
were killed by the security forces in an effort to crush the group entirely. This attempt by 
government sent the group underground while its leadership went into exile and made contact 
with foreign Jihadist groups. Boko Haram carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno state in 
January 2010 claiming the lives of four people. In June of the same year, its new leader 
Abubakar Shekau instructed members of the group to commence retaliatory target of security 
forces and traitors but to spare civilians.  
This dramatic change of events was the watershed of a chain reaction of suicide attacks 
that extended beyond Borno State for the first time. In September, Boko Haram broke 105 of its 
members out of prison in Maiduguri along with over 600 other prisoners. This later transcended 
several areas of northern Nigeria. Since then, Boko Haram has increased the frequency and 
intensity of its attack with increased suicide bombings and assassinations.  
Many believe that Boko Haram is leading an armed insurgency against corruption, 
abusive security forces and economic disparity in northern Nigeria, and feeding off tension that 
have existed between Muslim dominated north and Christian dominated south of Nigeria. In 
2011, with improved operational capabilities, Boko Haram launched series of attacks against 
both soft targets and security posts like the one in June, killing 6 police officers at the Abuja 
police headquarters (Abimbola, 2010:99).   
However, the groups attack on the United Nations building in Abuja in which 11 UN 
staff members died as well as 12 others, with more than 100 injured, seems to suggests that the 
group‟s ambition are broader than initially believed. The group carried out 115 attacks in 2011, 
killing 550. At the end of 2011, Boko Haram maintained a steady rate of attack with individuals, 
groups, security forces and religious leaders as prime targets. 
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The implementation of the emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 
Nigeria marked a turning point in Boko Haram insurgency.  Few days after the state of 
emergency was declared, the group embarked on a series of small-scale attacks on Christians and 
„strangers‟ (non-indigenes) resident in northern Nigeria. Members of the police force drafted in 
by government to protect fleeing „southerner‟ became prime targets. In Kano, on 20 January, 
Boko Haram carried out a deadly assault on police building killing 190 (Abimbola, 2010:112). 
Given the upsurge in the success recorded by the group against the security forces, many began 
to question the loyalty of the members of the Nigerian security force. This came to a head on 8 
January 2012, when the Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan announced that Boko Haram had, 
in fact, infiltrated the army and the police, as well as membership of the government. 
Since 2009, the Joint Task Force (JTF) was deployed to north-eastern Nigeria to quell 
Boko Haram violence. Unfortunately, the role of and abuses by this security force conspired to 
worsen the dire security condition in the area. In addition to the failure of the JTF to protect lives 
and property, it lost the trust of the people (an important resource in the battle against the 
insurgent group), as communities were also abused by the armed forces. Also, the high-
handedness with which the members of the JTF prosecuted the fight against the insurgency 
helped to diffuse membership of the group from urban centres to the rural areas, enhancing an 
increased collateral damage.  
The year 2013 witnessed the introduction of a new dimension to its insurgent activities by 
Boko Haram. Early into the year, the conflict spilled over the national borders to involve all four 
geographically contiguous countries in the sub-region (namely Cameroun, Chad, Niger and 
Nigeria). Added to this innovation, is the fact that Boko Haram in association with its splinter 
group Ansani, was linked to a number of kidnappings. The group kidnapped on different 
occasions seven French taunts in north of Cameroun in February, a French priest and other eight 
French citizens and obtained ransom payments for their release.  
Furthermore, the increased insecurity in north-east Nigeria led the government to extend 
the state of emergency in May 2013. This development was met by increased tension in the three 
states affected (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) as Boko Haram heightened the tempo of its 
insurgent activities. As such, the total number of internally displaced persons increased from 
250,000 to 650,000; an increase of 309 per cent and thousands of others fled the country 
(Osaretin 2015). 
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The most notorious act of Boko Haram so far took place in April 2014, when 276 girls 
from Chibok town in Borno state were kidnapped. Although over 50 of them managed to escape, 
the incident brought the group pervasive global attention. The girls‟ plight featured on “Bring 
Back Our Girls” posters all over the world. Within the same period, Boko Haram announced the 
formation of Islamic Caliphate which included Gwoza, a strategic town north-eastern Nigeria. 
The town of Bama, 70 kilometres from Maiduguri was equally captured (increasing the reach of 
the new caliphate).  
Despite the aggression of the Nigerian security forces against Boko Haram and suspected 
collaborators since 2009, the group continues to recruit new members. The upward trend in 
violence since then suggests that the more security forces have intervened, the worse the crisis 
has become. For the past years, the Nigeria government has demonstrated clearly that it is 
fighting the war against Boko Haram insurgency without a clear understanding of the sects world 
view. For a sect that morphed from a mere group of bandits to a group with international reach 
and armed with sophisticated weapons, it is imperative to understand its ideology.  
Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect advocating strict form 
of Sharia law. It developed into a Salafist-Jihadist group in 2009, influence, perhaps by the 
Wahhabi movement. Members of the sect believe that their interpretation of the Quran is the 
„true‟ Islam. Also they are convinced that this „true‟ Islam in holistic and embraces all aspects of 
Muslims life in preparation for eternity. Initially, the founder of Boko Haram (Mohammed 
Yusuf) set out to establish Sharia government in conjunction with Borno State Government in 
northern Nigeria in the administration of Ali Modu Sheriff. In fact, speculation has it that “owing 
to its growing influence, Governor Sheriff courted the group and rode on its popularity to win his 
re-election in 2007” (Osun Defender,  2015, c.f, Osaretin, 2015).  
The sect‟s main grudge against the Nigeria state is that the existing socio-economic 
condition is both wrong and repressive. Primarily, it is wrong according to this perspective 
because it does not correspond to Islamic principles. Thus, in order to get rid of this condition of 
repression and wrong doing, Boko Haram seeks to establish an Islamic state. As self-styled 
Sunnis, they want to return Islam to what they view as the interpretation of first generation 
Muslims. This is a direct reference to the classical era of the caliphate. Arguably, the Caliphate 
represents one of the longest political institutions in human history. Though its lifespan started in 
622 (right after the death of Mohammed) it was abolished by Mustafa Kenal in 1924.  
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Furthermore, the need to „rid‟ Nigeria of immoral and imperial Western domination and 
influences through the adoption of an Islamic path forms its basic objective. Therefore, to Boko 
Haram the solution to this problem lies in an embrace of Islamic teaching and an understanding 
that all „true‟ Muslims compose a single cohesive community and must work together to resist 
the encroachment of corrupt Western influences. As such, any Muslim that works contrary to this 
dictum is classed with „unbelievers‟. To realize this goal, the group intends to leave no stone 
unturned.   
Discussion  
Social Movement Theory (SMT) posits the conditions under which grievances, which are 
plentiful, transform into mass movements aimed at social or political change. A very vita effect 
of the Boko Haram terrorist scourge on Nigeria is in the economic sphere. Indeed, as it becomes 
clear that nobody is safe as the terrorists can strike anywhere, economic activities have been on 
the decline and expansion plans are put on hold. For example, foreign investors, who use to 
flow at least 200 billion dollars a year into the Nigeria economy, no longer view the Nigerian 
economy as the safe haven (The Guardian, 2011). 
Fundamentalism and Socio-Economic development in the North-Eastern Zone of Nigeria: 
a case of Boko Haram Movement 
For the underdeveloped countries of the world, foreign investment means a lot, in fact 
since the proliferation of terrorism by Boko Haram in the north-eastern part of Nigeria; foreign 
investors have to think twice before coming into the countries to invest. It has also caused the 
military forces to take over the internal security of some states where the activities of Boko 
Haram terrorism were on the high side, for example declaration of state of emergency in Yobe, 
Adamawa and Bormo State. This on its own is another ignition point for another violent attack, 
either sporadic shooting with some identified Boko Haram members, thereby causing collateral 
damage at the expense of security of the citizens. It also put the military professionalism in doubt 
with regard to the role of the military in a nation.  
In essence, the military force may not be at alert to notice external threats, losing the 
military combatant capability of battle field tactics, abuse of power by initiating military brutality 
in the civil society, engaging in an unprofessional activities either enticed by the social activities 
etc. The Boko Haram terrorist scourge in contemporary national relations creates a public 
atmosphere of anxiety and it has undermined confidence in government.  
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The terrorists‟ unpredictability and apparent randomness makes it virtually impossible for 
government to protect all potential victims. The public demand protections that the state cannot 
give, this leads to frustrated and fearful citizens, this automatically has implications for citizens 
loyalty to their government and when citizen„s loyalty to their government is in doubt, then 
national stability is threatened.  
In Maiduguri, Borno State, where the sect originated from, the frequent bombing and 
clashes between Boko Haram and security agents have weighed down seriously on commercial 
and business activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly grumbled while many 
people have fled the state. The Maiduguri Monday market said to be the biggest market in the 
city is reported to have been seriously affected as hundred of shop owners, especially southerners 
have closed their business and left the troubled city for their dear lives (Mohammed, 2007).  
According to the Borno State Commissioner of information, it will take the state 20 years 
to recover from this current predicament it has found itself. The security challenges have 
negatively impacted on both private and public sectors of the economy as many business men 
and traders have relocated their businesses from the city. About 75 percent of the over three 
million Igbo businessmen and trader who engage in both small and medium scale businesses are 
reported to have fled to Abuja and the South-East due to the growing insecurity posed by the 
activities of Boko Haram insurgence (The Sun, 2011).  
Federal government in 2013 raised the alarm over the devastating effect of Boko Haram 
insurgency on the region, warning that religious extremist will destroy the region if the activities 
of the Islamic sect are not curtailed. The then information minister, Mr. Labaran Maku, who 
spoke on behalf of the government, said that:  
that the region needs peace and stability more than any 
other region in the country, particularly because the region 
is clearly lagging behind in term of infrastructure, 
education and other development indices, declaring that the 
North„s economy is on the verge of collapse.  
The greatest of these scenarios is the amount of funds being diverted to security issues 
and related matters. The aim is to enable the country meet the challenges of the present threat in 
the country. These funds can be best utilized in providing infrastructures in the country, like 
good roads, electricity and other vital amenities that will enhance the economic development of 
Nigeria. The irony is that while the government is striving towards capacity building, the Boko 
Haram menace is crumbling all the efforts. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Theoretically, this study adopted the Social Movement Theory. Social Movement Theory 
(SMT) posits the conditions under which grievances transform into mass movements aimed at 
social or political change, which are rarer. McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald (1996:4) describe three 
variables that scholars of SMT have identified as necessary conditions for social movements to 
emerge: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (Appleby, Gabriel 
and Emmanuel, 2003:93). The political opportunities variable considers how political constraints 
and opportunities, particularly institutionalized politics, shape the emergence and success of 
social movements.  
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996:6), were of opinion that the political opportunity 
variable focuses specifically on how changes in both institutionalized politics and informal 
groups with political power explain the emergence of social movements (Lustick, 1988). 
Mobilizing structures, the second variable, are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (Jennifer, 2011).  
This variable builds off of two sub-theories: resource mobilization theory, which 
investigates the types of resources available to a group and how they are employed for 
mobilization; and social movement organizations, or how formal and informal groups and 
networks facilitate social movements (Mark, 2000:19). The third variable, framing processes, 
considers the role that narratives and a sense of common purpose play in the formation of social 
movements.  
(Robert & David, 2000:611) defines framing as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups 
of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action”. This variable includes difficult-to-measure aspects of social 
movements such as identity, symbols, cultural values and norms, ideology, and shared meaning. 
McAdam, et al (1996:4), “at a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of 
their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem”. 
 Furthermore, McAdam, et al (1996:4) hypothesizes that “cognitive liberation,” or the 
hope that change is possible, is necessary for social movements to emerge and is part of 
successful framing. Framing processes, in other words, seek to understand how participants in 
collective action understand the problem and its solution. Taken together, SMT posits that 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes explain the necessary 
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conditions that transform grievances into activism. As they take shape, social movements are 
highly visible collectives that aim to mobilize large numbers in order to effect change.  
Social movements tend to draw on pre-existing groups and their networks to mobilize 
individuals into loosely affiliated collectives. Given their size and loose organizational structure, 
social movements usually have porous borders and individuals can join and leave the cause with 
relatively little cost. Framing processes create the conditions through which individuals that join 
the movement share common meaning and purpose (Gregg, 2016). If done correctly, framing 
creates a form of collective peer pressure, where individuals feel compelled to join up to be part 
of the experience (Rosenberg, 2011).  
This point is further echoed by Williams (1995), who contends that the ideology of social 
movements needs to be rooted and understood in the wider society‟s culture in order to be 
effective. It is important to note that not all social movements are violent; in fact many 
successful movements have been purposefully non-violent. Non-violent social movements also 
exist in Islam, although less well-known, and include the 20th-century Pashtun Badshah Khan‟s 
creation of 100,000 non-violent Khudai Khidmatgars to oppose British rule in the frontier region 
of South Asia, and the current-day non-violent philosophy of Sheikh Jawdat Saeed (Halverson, 
2012). All of these movements have used religion to shape their non-violent social movements 
(Gene, 2010). When social movements turn violent, it is typically for a few key reasons.  
First, political opportunities may be blocked, such as changing a policy or a country‟s 
leader through elections. In such cases, violence becomes one of the few remaining options for 
change. Second, social movements may turn to violence if the movement has become frustrated 
and some of its members feel violence is necessary to realize its goal. Third, violence can also be 
a tool used to push for negotiations with the opposition.  
Finally, violence may also be used as a means to draw attention to the cause and inspire 
recruits. The goals of social movements are varied. They can range from mobilization to change 
a specific government policy to revolution. They can also mobilize to challenge social issues 
within a country or region. Regardless of the goal, social movements typically have specific 
objectives that draw the attention and support of elites, formal and informal organizations, and 
large numbers of individuals that agree with that immediate objective. Typically, once a social 
movement has achieved its goal, it demobilizes. 
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Religious social movements, a specific type of social movement, involve contention and 
mass mobilization that draw from religious resources and, in some cases, further religious goals. 
Christian (1996:1) argues that not only is religion useful for mobilization. Driskell, Elizabeth & 
Larry (2008:294), religion also informs framing and the goals for which social movements fight 
more broadly. Resources include trained, legitimate leaders; pre-existing networks, 
organizational structures, and communications channels; and material resources such as money, 
buildings, schools, and hospitals.  
Framing resources in religion include a moral framework to which adherents can relate; 
group cohesion and common identity; symbols and scripture that can be interpreted to justify the 
cause; and stories of persecution and perseverance that can create fortitude in difficult times 
(Christian, 1996:1). Several scholars have used SMT to explain the rise of recent religious social 
movements around the globe. More recently, scholars have used SMT to explain the rise of the 
2010–2011 Arab Spring, and the different roles that religion played in uprisings throughout 
several countries, including movements aimed at including religion in the goals for which groups 
are mobilizing (Bahgat & Rabab, 2012). 
 Finally, it is important to note that social movements may draw on religious resources 
for mobilization, but the goals for which the movement is directed may not be religious. An 
example of this would be the Boko Haram movement, which used Islamic ideology as a source 
of mobilization and legitimacy, but did not have overtly religious goals. 
Gunning (2009:156) offers a very good example of how social movement theory can help 
in explaining the act of fundamentalism. According to him, the real transformation for 
individuals to participate in this kind of activity often begins with participation with militant 
organizations through a process he called “political socialization”. Here the individuals can be 
groomed, and over the course of time, can develop strong affinities with one another and to the 
course; so much so that they conceive themselves as inseparable from the group. Porta (2009) 
also observed in the Italian case in 1995 that radicalization and dispositions to participate in 
certain political violence among most of activists she interviewed developed as a strong bond, 
which emanated from socializations within the group.  
According to her, people didn‟t just get motivated to participate just because of the 
groups‟ ideology or because they were members of the group. Rather, participation grew out of a 
processual dynamics, which may or may not take place when individuals get involved in groups 
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(Porta, 2009). Often through actions of opposition and other forms of activism, individuals have 
investments in terms of their own identities and emotions that tend to create strong links with 
individuals within the groups. Often this bond is so strong that it motivates and continues to 
mobilize participants to adopt any means possible, as long as it protects their members‟ interests.  
Conclusion 
This study argues that the socio-economic and cultural ecology which contemporary 
Nigerian state presents help to sustain fundamentalist‟s ideology in terms of its organizational 
structure, group activities and sub-regional reach (Osaretin, 2015). This offers the key to the 
understanding of the support base of Boko Haram. The study also argues that the ideology which 
is at the heart of Boko Haram‟s philosophy is ultimately religious focused. Thus, the group 
appeals to religious sentiment to recruit members and sustain its momentum. Although 
conflicting narratives have been applied to explain the rise and transformation of Boko Haram in 
northern Nigeria, this study discovered that the primary concerns of the group center on the 
domination of Nigeria by Western influences, the poverty of the Nigerian people (particularly 
those that reside in northern Nigeria) and the declining morality it identifies in both the Nigerian 
state and the lives of individual Nigerians.  
It also shows that Boko Haram‟s beliefs make adherent psychologically predisposed to 
use violence and surrender their lives to propagate the ideology of the group. Also the existing 
abysmal social conditions and frustration prevalent in north-eastern Nigeria help to promote 
extremism. This is further re-enforced by state neglect and falling standard of living which spur a 
violent backlash from Boko Haram. Nonetheless, the paper is of the view that there is a 
convergence between explanations which consider insurgency as a result of internalized radical 
Islamic beliefs (the type propagates by Boko Haram) and those that locate them in the 
externalized socio-economic conditions of the Nigerian state. 
On the apparent inability of the Nigerian state to stop Boko Haram in its trail despite the 
different official responses, the paper reveals that primarily, the missing link is that the Nigerian 
government has operated so far a one-instant therapy to all the issues that mutually sustain the 
logic of the group. While the fire-for-fire approach is the most visible response of the Nigerian 
government, for a group whose recruitment and training lay important emphasis on the 
radicalization of its members and strong connection with a section of society, this policy option 
is insufficient to stop its expansionist tendencies (Osaretin, 2015).  
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Rather, it would help to alienate those who feel connected to the peripheral sectors of society; 
who are sympathetic to the ideology, sentiments, idiosyncrasies and dialectical peculiarities and 
local circumstances and above all, who tends to create and preserved their socio-religious 
identity in Nigeria.  
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